Strategic politics in Colombia: today the real work begins

By Rebekah Sears, Policy Educator and Advocacy Worker for MCC Colombia.

The Colombian Presidential race of 2014 was one of the closest in recent history. In last night’s run-off vote, incumbent Juan Manuel Santos was re-elected with just 51% of the vote, while the Centro Democratico’s hardline candidate Oscar Ivan Zuluaga picked up about 45% (the rest of the counted votes being protest/spoiled ballots, or en blanco).

It was a close and intense race indeed, filled with wheeling and dealing, propaganda, accusations, alliances, and last minute promises. But today the real work begins.

Today, Colombia has never been closer to a peace agreement that would bring an end to 50 years of armed conflict. Since late 2012 representatives from the government have been in Havana meeting with members of the FARC on a five-point peace agenda. And last week, the government announced that talks will soon begin with another guerrilla group, the ELN.

In many ways this election was centred around the prospects for peace–Santos wanting to continue the current process, while Zuluaga had pressed for a hardline, militant approach. Santos’s victory does ensure that the talks in Havana will continue, but it will take much more than a set of peace accords to bring lasting peace to Colombia.

Here are a couple of issues to watch in Santos’s next 4 years.

First: Keep your promises, Santos.

As an example, let’s look at Santos’s proposal for scraping obligatory military service–one of his last-minute campaign promises–to be fulfilled if Colombia reaches a peace agreement. It was a pleasant surprise and victory for those that work in the area of conscientious objection. And if he actually follows through in good faith it will likely eliminate some of our partners’ work in this area. But that’s the whole point of NGOs, right, to become unnecessary?

Second: Put in place integrated peace and reconciliation strategies designed for the long haul

Progress continues to be made at the table in Havana with tentative agreements on three of the five points (land reform, political participation and illicit drug production and trafficking). Negotiators are currently tackling the issue of victims and reparations, which will be followed by strategies to finally bring an end to the conflict.

These are good developments, but can they ensure a lasting peace?

In several cases in Central America, where internal armed conflicts were brought to an end by peace accords, such agreements did not bring an end to violence or conflict. What often happens is what was more “structured” violence turns into “less structured” violence in urban and rural areas. For this reason, strategies like demobilization, full re-integration and reconciliation are crucial.

Otherwise, we’ll just have the same situation that came about with the demobilization of the Paramilitary groups in the mid-2000s. The top leaders were disarmed and many put in prison, but in many cases, the middle and low ranking members assumed control, and the groups function more or less under the same command structures.

Peace accords would be a start, but only that. Lasting peace with take years of investment in these and other key post-conflict strategies.

Third: Santos cannot ignore the concerns of the campo forever

This comes down to several key issues, but can be summed up in one idea: Santos seems intent on selling off the country and resources to the highest bidder.

When it comes to the land itself, small scale and often landless farmers, or campesinos, are constantly struggling against the growing presence of multi-national and mega mono-crop projects, taking up their land and often destroying their way of life. Plus, with the emergence of free trade agreements, farmers are now required to buy new certified seeds every season, often sold by major multi-national companies, instead to preserving their own naturally.

In August and September 2013, campesinos from all over the country held protests and shut down major highways, calling for government subsidies and investment. A tentative agreement on agrarian reform was reached at the peace talks in Havana just weeks before this strike, but it still took Santos weeks to even acknowledge the national strike and his government has yet to fulfil promises eventually made to campesino groups as evidenced by subsequent protests. Santos seems to be uninterested in genuinely addressing these concerns.

Mining/extractive industries also negatively impact campesinos and the land, but unlike agrarian issues, they are not an agenda item in the current peace negotiations, even though in the last several years, the mining industry has exploded (no pun intended) in Colombia. Also dominated by multi-national companies the government is seeking to criminalize artisanal initiatives in favour of people working for the mega-projects.

Colombia is rich in several extractive materials, like gold and oil, but it is only required that multi-national companies leave 4% of royalties within the country, and it is not required that these royalties stay within the regions where the company is working. In addition, gold is taking over from illicit crops as a funding source for illegal armed groups in many regions, therefore militarizing the commodity and creating more violence and risk in gold-rich areas.

The re-election of Santos leaves many hopeful, especially considering the alternatives. The current peace talks will continue and there is a real hope for peace accords, possibly before the end of the year, bringing an end to 50 years of conflict. But it’s a cautious hope, recognizing what factors are still at play that could jeopardize the generation a stable long-lasting peace.